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CHAPTER I 
LUTHER'S "DEFEATISM" IN SOCIAL ETHICS 
In one section of his book, The Nature and Destiny of  
Man, Reinhold Niebuhr constructs a critique of the Lutheran 
Reformation,. and particularly of Martin Luther's theology 
as the formative theoretical base of Lutheran Reformation 
theology.' One of Niebuhr's specific charges was that the 
Lutheran Reformation was explicitly defeatist when confron- 
ting the problems of realizing justice in the collective life of 
man.2  Niebukr lays a great deal of the blame for this 
"Lutheran defeatism" on Luther's formulation of the two 
kingdom doctrine and his application of it to legitimize 
the suppression by the government of the peasant revolt of 
1525.3  
Without describing the theological basis upon which 
Niebuhr stands in leveling his critique against Luther's 
position, we nevertheless wish to examine the charge that 
Luther's two kingdom teaching, as Luther himself formulates 
it and applies it, is indeed defeatist in realizing justice 
in the collective life of man. 
'Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), II, 165-196. 
2Ibid., p. 192. 
3lbid., pp. 192-5. 
2 
In order to do this, we shall first examine Luther's 
two kingdom teaching as he himself formulates it and applies 
it, looking also into some of the historical circumstances 
which surrounded its development. Following this, we shall 
examine Niebuhr's portrayal of Luther to see if it is fair 
and adequate, or, if not, in what ways it is deficient. 
Finally, we shall try to assess what validity there is 
in Niebuhr's critique, and on what basis. 
CHAPTER II 
LUTHER'S TEACHING ON T:i0 KINGDOMS 
Luther's basic teaching of the two kingdoms can be 
found in his Sermon on the Mount (1521) and in Secular 
Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed (1523). 
Luther then applied this teaching in response to the ' 
peasant revolt in his writings Admonition to Peace (1525) 
and Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants  
(1525). The question will be raised whether Luther 
consistently applied the teaching he first espoused to 
the historical situation as it was presented to him. 
Luther, in his commentary on Matt. 5:38-42, taken 
from The Sermon on the Mount, makes an explicit statement 
of his doctrine of the two kingdoms. Luthers says that 
this text (which talks about not returning evil for evil, 
about turning the other cheek, etc.) is falsely interpreted 
by those who fail to distinguish between the kingdom of 
Christ and the kingdom of the world, between the secular 
and the spiritual.' Luther here constructs his doctrine 
in antithesis both to the Roman Catholic legitimation of 
the pope and his realm, which "has developed into nothing 
"Martin Luther, The Sermon on the Mount, in Luther's 
Works, Vol. XXI, ed. by Jaroslav Pelikan (Bt. Louis: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1956), 105. 
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more than a secular dominion, so dreadful that the world 
has had to submit to him," and to the argument of Muenzer 
and his peasants, who used the passage as a legitimation 
for trying to take over the government.2  
According to Luther, Christ in this passage is not 
dealing with government affairs. Rather 
He is teaching his individual Christians how to 
live personally, apart from their official 
positions and authority. They should not desire 
revenge at al1.3 
Thus God does not want this ethic utilized for 
governing the world: 
It is the duty and obligation of those who participate 
in this earthly regime to administer law and punishment, 
to maintain the distinction that exists among ranks 
and persons, to manage and distribute property. 
This way everything will be in good shape .... 
But the Gospel does not trouble itself with these 
matters. It teaches about the right relation of 
the heart to God, while in all these other questions 
it should take care to stay pure and not to stumble 
into a false righteousness. . . . Christ is talking 
about a spiritual existence and life and that He is 
addressing himself to His Christians. He is telling 
them to live and behave before God and in the world 
with their heart dependent upon God and uninterested 
in things like secular rule or government, power 
or punishment, anger or revenge.4 
Luther then draws out the implications of his teaching 
for the individual Christian: 
Now, if someone asks whether a Christian may go to 
court or defend himself, the answer is simply no. 
A Christian is the kind of person who has nothing 
to do with this sort of secular existence and law. He 
2lbid., pp. 107-8. 
3Ibid., p. 106. 
4Ibid., p. 108. 
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belongs to a kingdom or realm where . . . . mutual 
love and service should prevail.5 
To the question of whether or not a Christian may 
then serve as a secular official, such as a ruler or 
a judge, Luther replies, 
Yes; God Himself has ordained and established 
this secular realm and its distinctions, and by 
His Word He has confirmed and commended them. For 
without them this life could not endure. Vde are 
all included in them . . . . but only according to 
our outward life and our physical existence.6 
Luther then makes a distinction between a Christian 
"as regards his own person," which he has already described 
and to whom Christ's word in Matt. 5:38-42 applies, and the 
"Christian-in-relation," which he proceeds to describe: 
A Christian has to be a secular person of some 
sort. . . . outwardly, according to his body and 
property, he is related by subjection and obliga-
tion to the emperor, inasmuch as he occupies some 
office or station in life or has a house and home, 
a wife and children; for all these are things that 
pertain to the emperor. Here he must necessarily 
do what he is told and what this outward life 
requires. . . . 
. . . we are talking about a Christian-in-relation: 
not about his being a Christian, but about this life 
and his obligation in it to some other person . . . . 
Here it would be a mistake to teach: "Turn the other 
cheek, and throw your cloak away with your coat.n7 
5Ibid., p. 108. 
6ibid., p. 109. 
7lbid., pp. 109-10. 
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Luther draws out the implications of this teaching 
for the Christian-in-relation: 
Thus you are not forbidden to go to court and lodge 
a complaint against injustice or violence . . . . 
Certainly we are not compelled or obliged to let every 
insolent person run rampant all over the place . . . 
without doing anything about it--not if we can follow 
orderly procedure in defending ourselves.0 
Luther further Points out that it is possible for the 
Christian to act with a pure heart, not only as an 
individual, but also as a secular person: 
A Christian may carry on all sorts of secULar 
business with impunity--not as a Christian but as 
a secular person--while his heart remains pure in 
his Christianity, as Christ demands. This the world 
cannot do . . . .9 
Luther summarizes his distinction thus: 
A Christian should not resist any evil; but within 
the limits of his office, a secular person should 
oppose every evil. . . . In short, the rule in the 
kingdom of Christ is the toleration of everything, 
forgiveness, and the recompense of evil with good. 
On the other hand, in the realm of the emperor, 
there should be no tolerance shown toward any 
injustice, but rather a defense against wrong and 
a punishment of it, and an effort to defend and 
maintain the right, according to what each one's 
office or station may require.10 
Luther recognizes that there are "rogues and rascals" 
who occupy public office and who administer unjustly. 
8Ibid., pp. 111-12. 
9Ibid., p. 113. 
1°Ibid. 
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Luther offers those Christian who suffer such unjust 
treatment this advice: 
most often this happens to pious Christians. The 
world hates them regardless, and it takes pleasure in 
tormenting them. Therefore Christ tells them beforehand 
that in the world they ought to expect this sort of 
thing and ought to yield to suffering. Especially 
if it happens on account of that which makes them 
Christians, that is on account of the Gospel and the 
spiritual realm, they should be prepared to take 
punishment and to lose everything. Vie have to suffer 
anyway, since as individual persons we have no power 
or defense against the government if it should set 
itself against us. But where this is not the case 
you can use the law to defend and protect yourself 
against some violence to you or yours, then it is 
your right and your duty to do so.11 
Luther's advice to those suffering injustice is that 
they must bear it. The phrase in his last sentence 
"where this is not the case" refers to where it is not the 
case that there are Unjust rulers, not to the transition 
from the case of the individual to that of a group suffering 
'uther here does not recognize the possibility 
revolution. Further, he regards governmental 
in terms of Unjust office holders rather than 
of unjust laws or unjust governmental structures. 
In his treatise, Secular ,Wthority: To'.hat Extent It  
Should Be Obeyed,' Luther even more clearly states his two 
kingdom teaching in opposition to the enthusiast view that 
the world could be ruled according to the precepts of the 
Sermon on the Lount, and also against the scholastic 
1 lIbid., p. 115. 
injustice. 
of a just 
injustice 
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doctrine that the absolute demands of Christ made in the 
Sermon on the Mount were to be regarded as "counsels of 
Perfection" binding only on a small number of elite 
Christians.12 The result of this latter teaching was that 
temporal authority was ascribed to the pope, and that 
rulers under his influence would, 
order the people to put away books, and to believe 
and keep what they prescribe, In this way they 
presumptuously set themselves in God's place, lord 
it over men's conscience and faith, and put the 
Holy Spirit to school according to their mad brains.13 
In contradistinction, Luther says, 
We must divide all the children of Adam into two classes; 
the first belong to the kingdom of God, the second to 
the kingdom of the world. Those belonging to the 
kingdom of Christ are all true believers in Christ and 
are subject to Christ. . . . 
All who are not Christians belong to the kingdom of 
the world and are under the law.14 
The purpose then of the worldly government is to 
preserve order: 
For this reason these two kingdoms must be sharply 
distinguished, and both be permitted to remain; the one 
to produce piety, the other to bring about external 
peace and prevent evil deeds; neither is sufficient in 
the world without the other. For no one can become 
12idartin Luther, "Secular Authority: To 'hat 1.xtent It 
Should Be Obeyed," in Martin Luther, ed. by John Dillenberger 
(Garden City: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 364. 
13Ibid., pp. 364-5. 
14Ibid., pp. 366, 370. 
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pious before God by means of the secular government, 
without Christ's spiritual rule.15 
Luther comes to the conclusion that since the govern-
ment was instituted to restrain evil, and since Christ's 
teachings apply to all Christians, if all people on earth 
were Christian, then there would be no need of government, 
for Christ would rule by His Holy Spirit alone, without 
law. 
Luther does not forget, however, that the Christian 
is both saint and sinner. Thus, on the one hand, even 
though Luther does not emphasize this point, yet he 
recognizes that, 
Since . . . no one is by nature Christian or pious, 
but every one sinful and evil, God places the restraints 
of the law upon them all, so that they may not dare 
give rein to their desires and commit outward, wicked 
deeds.17 
On the other hand, Luther says the Christian willingly 
submits to the government for the sake of his non-Christian - . 
neighbor: 
Since, however, a true Christian lives and labors on 
earth not for himself but for his neighbor, therefore 
the whole spirit of his life impels him to do even 
that which he need not do, but which is profitable 
and necessary for his neighbor. Because the sword is 
15Ibid., p. 371. 
16Ibid., p. 372. 
17Ibid., p. 369. 
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a very great benefit and necessary to the whole 
world, to preserve peace, to punish sin and to prevent 
evil, he submits most willingly to the rule of the 
sword, pays tax, honors those in authority, serves, 
helps, and does all he can to further the government, 
that it may be sustained and held in honor and fear.18 
Luther ultimately arrives at a conclusion very similar 
to that expressed in his commentary on Matt. 5:38-42: 
In what concerns you and yours, you govern yourself 
by the Gospel and suffer injustice for yourself as 
a true Christian; in what concerns others and 
belongs to them, you govern yourself according to 
love and suffer no injustice for your neighbor's sake; 
this the Gospel does not forbid, but rather commands 
in another place.19 
Luther summarizes: 
From all this we see what is the true meaning of 
Christ's words in 1Latthew 5, "Resist not evil," etc. 
It is this, that a Christian should be so disposed that 
he will suffer every evil and injustice, not avenge 
himself nor bring suit in court, and in nothing make 
use of secular power and law for himself. Tor others, 
however, he may and should seek vengeance, justice, 
protection and help, and do what he can toward this. 
Likewise, the State should, either of itself or 
through the instigation of others, help and protect 
him without complaint, application or instigation 
on his part. When the State does not do this, he 
ought to permit himself to be robbed and despoiled, 
and not resist the evil as Christ's words say.20 
It should be noted here that in his "Open Letter on 
the Harsh Boot against the Peasants,IlLuther gives the 
example where a person with wife and children is attacked 
18Ibid., p. 373. 
191bid., p. 375. 
20Ibid., p. 379 
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by a thief or murderer. In such a case, Luther says in 
effect that the man should consider himself as a 
Christian-in-relation and not as one suffering injustice 
only personally. Such a person has the right of self-
defense. 21 
This raises the Question, what kind of situation 
would Luther consider to be that of a Christian 
individual suffering injustice alone and not as one 
in relation. Luther's qualification here would seem 
to limit such situations. 
In a further point, underlining that the state is 
a divine service, Luther says that a Christian can 
serve in a public office and perform all its duties 
without peril and without sinning.22 
It is evident that the first section of the treatise, 
from which the above several quotes were taken, was 
formulated in contrast to the enthusiasts' teaching, in 
an effort to outline what Luther saw as the legitimate 
and God-directed way for Christians to relate to secular 
government. 
21Luther's Works, ed. H.T. Lehmann and J. Pelikan 
(St. Louis and Philadelphia, 1955--), XLVI, 71. Hereafter 
cited as LW. 
22"Secular Authority," p. 381. 
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In the second part of the thesis, in which Luther 
examines how far secular authority extends, Luther is 
formulating his teaching in contrast to Roman Catholic 
teaching. That Luther considers this second section 
the main part of his treatise23 is significant. It shows 
that however much Luther at this times considered the 
enthusiasts' teaching a threat, he considered the Roman 
Catholic aberrations much more dangerous. Luther's 
position is clear: 
Human ordinance cannot possibly extend its authority 
to heaven and over souls, but belongs only to earth, 
to the external intercourse of men with eadh other, 
where men can see, know, judge, sentence, punish and 
acquit.24 
Luther believed that temporal authorities had no 
right to govern regarding spiritual matters and that it 
would be legitimate for subjects to resist when the 
government would attempt to govern in these areas. Speaking 
to the temporal lord, Luther says, 
Dear Lord, I owe you obedience with life and goods; 
command me within the limits of your power on 
earth, and I will obey. But if you command me to 
believe, and to put away books, I will not obey; for 
in this case you are a tyrant and overreach yourself, 2,;  
and command where you have neither right nor power, etc. 2' 
23Ibid., p. 382. 
24Ibid., p. 387. 
25Ibid., p. 388. 
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In the third section of his treatise Luther gives 
advice to rulers as to how they should govern. ?or one 
thing they should rule by the spirit rather than by the 
letter of the law: 
Therefore a prince must have the law in hand as 
firmly as the sword, and decide in his own mind 
when and where the law must be applied strictly 
or with moderation, so that reason may always 
control all law and be the highest law and rule 
over all laws.26 
Does Luther envisage any situation in which it would 
be legitimate to resist the government in temporal matters? 
Luther is ambiguous here. In one case, he says that 
government must not be resisted by force, but in another 
case he seems to allow for civil disobedience: 
One must not resist the government with force, but 
only with knowledge of the truth; if it is influenced 
by it, well; if not, you are innocent, and suffer 
wrong for God's sake.27 
But when a prince is in the wrong, are his people bound 
to follow him then too? I answer, No, for it is no 
one's duty to do wrong; we ought to obey God Who 
desires the right, rather than men. How is it, when 
the subjects do not know whether the prince is in the 
right or not? I answer, As long as they cannot know, 
nor find out by any possible means, they may obey 
without peril to their souls.28 
26Ibid., p. 393. 
27Ibid., p. 398. 
28Ibid., 13. 399. 
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Luther applied his two kingdom doctrine to the 
peasant revolt of 1525 in two writings, "Admonition to 
Peace" and "Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes 
of Peasants." The first document was written in late 
April, 1525, in response to "The Twelve Articles," a 
document drawn up by the peasants protesting their 
grievances and demanding fairer treatment of the 
princes. In "Admonition to Peace," Luther appealed to 
both the peasants and the princes to settle their 
differences and suggested arbitration as a means to 
that end. Luther hoped that his appeal would help 
avert bloodshed and strife, which had already broken out 
in some places, from becoming widespread. Before the 
"Admonition to Peace" could be published, however, 
insurrection, arson, pillage, and murder did become 
widespread.29 In response, Luther wrote "Against the 
Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants" in early May, 
1525, condemning the peasants and enjoining the rulers to 
use every means to suppress the rebellion.30 
Niebuhr bases a major part of his critique of Luther's 
two kingdom teaching on Luther's application of that 
teaching in these two documents. At least two issues 
29LW, ILVI, 6-8 
30Ibid., p. 48. 
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need to be clarified. Did Luther consistently apply his 
two kingdom teaching, as espoused in his commentary on 
Matt. 5:38-42 and in "Secular Authority," to the peasant 
revolt? If not, what are the historical circumstances 
surrounding the peasant revolt and Luther's reaction to 
it which might shed light on the situation? 
In "Admonition to Peace," Luther showed that he 
considered the imminent peasant rebellion, 
a great and dangerous matter. It concerns both the 
kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world. If 
this rebellion were to continue and get the upper 
hand, both kingdoms would be destroyed and there 
would be neither worldly government nor word of 
God, which would ultimately result in the permanent 
destruction of all Germany.31 
Luther's fear of the breakdown of law and order is 
more understandable when seen in light of the fact that 
Luther felt that he was living in the last times, and 
that the apocalyptic signs of the end of the world as 
described in Mt. 24, Mark 13, and Luke 21, were being 
fulfilled in his time. The fallout between Luther and 
Erasmus on the question of the bondage of the will, the 
disturbances of the peasants, the threat of invasion by 
the Turks, the opposition of the pope and the emperor to 
the gospel, as well as certain destructive occurrences in 
3 'Ibid., p. 18. 
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the world of nature, seemed for Luther to be signs of 
the approaching end of the world and the indication of 
increasing opposition and conflict between the devil and 
God's will. Luther's letters reflect this mood. This 
state of affairs 'made it all the more important to Luther 
that law and order be maintained and the gospel preached. 032 
It is significant that Luther blamed the rebellion 
totally on those in authority, both political and 
religious: 
As temporal rulers you do nothing but cheat and rob 
the people so that you may lead a life of luxury 
and extravagance. The poor common people cannot 
bear it any longer.33 
Luther saw the imminent rebellion of the peasants 
as the judgment of God upon the rulers, even though at 
the same time he encouraged the peasant not to rebel but 
to be obedient.34  
Luther noted that many of the requests made by the 
peasant in the twelve articles were right and just, and 
should be dealt with by the rulers. 2urther, the presence 
of selfish elements in the articles were only brought on 
by the rulers not responAing to earlier peasant requests. 
32Ibid., n. 3. 
331bid., p. 19 
34Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
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Luther stated that "rulers are not appointed to exploit 
their subjects for their own profit and advantage, but to 
be concerned about the welfare of their subjects."35  
At another point, when addressing the peasants, Luther writes: 
It is not my intention to justify or defend the rulers 
in the intolerable injustices which you suffer from 
them. They are unjust, and commit heinous wrongs 
against you.36 
The fact that Luther put the blame for the rebellion 
on the princes and their unjust treatment is not brought 
out by Niebuhr in his critique of Luther. 
Addressing the peasants, Luther said that they should 
be careful to take up their cause justly with a good 
conscience. "No one, by his own violence, should arrogate 
authority to himself."37 
Luther notes further, 
the fact that the rulers are wicked and unjust does 
not excuse disorder and rebellion, for the punishing 
of wickedness is not the responsibility of everyone, 
but of the worldly rulers who bear the sword.38 
Moreover, the fact that they were unwilling to suffer 
any wrong was not only contrary "to Christian law and the 
35Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
36Ibid., p. 32. 
37Ibid., pp. 23, 25. 
38Ibid., p. 25. 
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gospel, but also to natural law and all equity."39 Luther 
said that the rulers did wrong by oppressing the peasants, 
but that the peasants would do a greater wrong by rebelling 
and overturning authority. Moreover, Luther saw this offense 
as so serious, that those who engaged in such rebellion 
would lose their body, property, and soul for all eternity.40 
In his critique, Niebuhr takes this quote from 
Luther's "Admonition to Peace": 
You will not bear that anyone inflict evil of injustice 
upon you, but you want to be free and suffer only 
justice and goodness. . . . If you do not want to 
bear such a right [the right of sufferin4 you had 
better Put away your Christian name and boast of 
another name in accordance with your deeds or Christ 
himself will snatch away his name from you.41 
In the context of this quote, Luther is reminding the 
peasants that the peasants claimed to be Christians since 
the name of their orgahization was "Christian Association." 
Luther then goes on to add that Christ's word to Christians 
demanded a stance of non-resistance and the enduring of 
suffering. Luther argues, 
The Christian law tells us not to strive against 
injustice, not to grasp the sword, not to protect 
ourselves, not to avenge ourselves, but to give up 
life and property, and let whoever takes it have 
391bid. 
40Ibid., pp. 26-28. 
41Niebullr, p. 194, n. 16. 
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it. . . . aufferingl Sufferings Cross! Cross! This 
and nothing else is the Christian law.42 
Luther proposes that the peasants should follow the example 
of Christ who did not resist injustice when he was being 
tried and crucified.42 
In,his "Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of 
Peasants," Luther condemned the peasants with three 
charges. One, they had broken their oaths of loyalty 
and obedience to their rulers. "God wants people to be 
loyal and to do their duty." Two, they had started a 
rebellion and were violently robbing and plundering. 
Tor Luther, this gave anyone the right to "smite, slay, 
and stab, secretly or ppenly" to quell this "great fire." 
Three, they had cloaked this sin with the gospel, and thus 
blasphemed God's name. For these crimes, Luther said, 
they deserved death in body and soul.43 
The question may be raised whether or not Luther here 
applies his own two kingdom teaching in a way that is 
inconsistent from the teaching as he first espoused it. 
In both his commentary on iiatt. 5:38-42 and in "Secular 
Authority" Luther taught that the Christian who suffers 
injustice affectiri himself alone should allow himself to 
be despoiled, but that the Christian not only may but must 
42LW, 2I1V, pp. 28-30. 
43Ibid., pp. 49-51. 
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seek justice, protection, and help for his neighbor. 
To be sure, Luther expected that this appeal to redress 
grievances would take place in an orderly fashion, through 
proper channels. But, as was indicated, Luther did not leave 
out the possibility of a form of civil disobedience. At 
one time, in fact, Luther gave his approval to certain 
soldiers who had deserted the army of Joachim of Brandenburg 
because they felt the war they were to be fighting was 
unjust.44 Further, as was indicated above, it was only 
shortly after the peasant revolt, in his "Open Letter on 
the Harsh Book Against the Peasants," written in July, 1525, 
that Luther made an important qualification that limited 
those situations in which a Christian suffered only 
personally and not "in-relation." 
But to the peasants, Luther says: 
To sum it up . . . . You want power and wealth so 
that you will not suffer injustice. The gospel, 
however, does not become involved in the affairs of 
this world, but speaks of our life in the world in 
terms of suffering, injustice, the cross, patience, 
and contempt for this life and temporal wealth. How, 
then, does the gospel agree with you?45 
Refering to the matters of the freedom to hunt game 
animals and birds, to catch fish, to use wood from the 
forest, the peasants obligation to provide free labor, 
44Roland Bainton, Here I Stand, A Life of Martin Luther 
(New York: Mentor, 1950), p. 169. 
4 5IW, XLVI, 35-36. 
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the amount of their rents and taxes, the death tax, etc., 
Luther said, 
These things do not concern a Christian, . . . he 
cares nothing about them. He lets anyone who will 
rob, take, cheat, scrape, devour, and rage--for 
the Christian is a martyr on earth. Therefore the 
peasants ought properly to stop using the name Christian 
and use some other name . . . . 2or obtaining their 
rights as Christians would mean they should keep 
quiet about all these matters and complain only to 
God when they suffer.46 
Here Luther does not seem to recognize, as he had 
before, the validity of Christians defending others for 
the sake of justice. In this regard, it should be noted 
that Luther does not seem to argue from the point of view 
that the peasants were each suffering as individuals and 
that because they were not Christians-in-relation, they 
could not justly revolt. This line of reasoning does 
not seem to appear. Instead, Luther argues over and over 
again, that since the peasants claimed to be Christians, 
and since Christ said that Christians should expect to 
suffer, that the peasants should bear their grievances. 
The fact of the matter was that Luther, in trying 
to give advice in this situation, was caught in an awkward 
and inescapable dilemma. James Preus describes the 
dilemma well: 
the ethical conflict for the concerned Christian in 
face of the peasant's oppression and revolt can be 
4 6Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
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seen as a clash between these principles: the 
obligation to defend the neighbor against injustice 
on one hand, and the obligation to obey legitimate 
authorities on the other. V.hat, in short, was 
to be done when the authorities themselves were the 
ones who were oppressing one's neighbors?47 
The fact that after more than a hundred years of 
peasant struggle,48 both the peasants and the princes had 
come to take unyielding and opposing positions, left 
Luther with having to make a choice of the lesser of 
two evils. He supported the rulers in squelching the 
revolt, because he saw the alternative in extremely 
dire terms. He writes at one point: 
If the peasants happen to gain the upper hand 
(God forbids) . . . to destroy all rule and order 
and cast the world upon a desolate heap, as a 
prelude to the Last Day, which cannot be far off . . • 49 
But in actuality, Luther felt that the rulers were just 
as culpable as the peasants. If the peasants would be 
destroyed and lost eternally because of their rebellion, 
the rulers would suffer no lesser fate for their injustice. 
In anticipation of an ensuing revolt and its suppression, 
Luther writes of the rulers in "Admonition to Peace:" 
The lords would be fighting to strengthen and main-
tain their tyranny, their persecution of the gospel, 
47James S. Preus, "The Political Function of Lutherb 
Doctrinal" Concordia Theological 1%Lonthly, XIIII (October, 
1972), p97. 
48LW, LVI, 5 
491bid., p. 54. 
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and their unjust oppression of the poor, or else to 
help that kind of ruler. That is a terrible injustice 
and is against God. He who commits such a sin must 
be lost eternally.50 
5 °Ibid., p. 42. 
L. 
CHAPTER III 
NIEBUHR'S CRITIQUE OF LUTHER 
Specific aspects of Niebuhr's critique of Luther now 
need to be examined. It will be asked, first of all, whether 
Niebuhr accurately portrays Luther, either in terms of 
Luther's espoused two kingdom teaching, or in terms of 
Luther's application of it during the peasant revolt. 
Secondly, it will be asked in what respect Niebuhr's 
critique is valid. 
Describing his own position, Niebuhr asserts: 
The Kingdom of God and the demands of perfect love 
are therefore relevant to every political system 
and impinge upon every social situation in which 
the self seeks to come to terms with the claims of 
other life.1 
Niebuhr then quotes the following from Luther's 
Commentary on Galatians, 1535, to show that Luther explicitly 
denies this relevance: 
The wu to discern the difference [between law and 
gospel is to place the gospel in heaven and the law 
on the earth: to call the righteousness of the gospel 
heavenly, and the righteousness of the law earthly and 
to put as great a difference between them as God hath 
made between heaven and earth. . . . Wherefore if the 
question be concerning the matter of faith and conscience 
let us utterly exclude the law and leave it on earth. . . 
Contrariwise in civil policy obedience to law must 
be severely required. There nothing must be known 
1Niebuhr, p. 192. 
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concerning the conscience, the Gospel, grace, 
remission of sins, heavenly righteousness or 
Christ himself; but Moses only with the law and 
the works thereof.2 
The context of this Niebuhr quote is Luther's 
commentary on Galatians 2:14, where Luther comments on 
Paul's reprimanding of Peter, Barnabas, and other Jews 
who were acting insincerely toward the Gentiles. Luther 
then goes into an excursus on the value and art of distin-
guishing the Gospel from the Law. Luther's purpose for 
making the sharp distinction he does in the passage quoted 
is to keep the Gospel pure, as Luther notes: 
Peter had confused this distinction between the Law 
and the Gospel, and thus he had persuaded the 
believers that they had to be justified by the 
Gospel and the Law together.3 
The basic problem with Niebuhr's analysis here is that 
he picks up just one pole of a dialectic which Luther 
developed in his two kingdom teaching. Vihen Luther 
speaks of the gracious justification by God of the sinner 
for the sake of Christ, which he was doing in the Galatians 
passage, Luther jealously separates out any element of the 
Person's living in accordance with the law as a causative 
factor in God's justifying action upon that person. The 
resultant righteousness, as Luther puts it in his tract 
2Ibid. 
31.1.', XXVI, 115-117. 
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"Two Kinds of Righteousness," 1519, is an alien righteous- 
ness, that is, the righteousness of Christ, instilled from 
without.4 
But this does not mean that the Christian does not do 
good works. Indeed, there is another kind of righteousness 
which is the product of the alien righteousness: "that 
manner of life spent profitably in good works."5 This 
is "our proper righteousness, not because we alone work it, 
but because we work with that first and alien righteousness. "6.  
Moreover, this Proper righteousness expresses itself in 
three ways, "in slaying the flesh and crucifying the 
desires with respect. to the self, . . . in love to one's 
neighbor, . . . in meekness and fear toward God."7 
In "The Freedom of the Christian Man," Luther 
expresses the overflowing of good works that results when 
a person in faith truly experiences this "alien righteous- 
ness:" 
Behold, from faith thus flow forth love and joy in the 
Lord, and from love a joyful, willing, and free mind 
that serves one's neighbor willingly and takes no 
account of gratitude or ingratitude, of praise or 
4Dillenberger, p. 86. 
5Ibid., pp. 88-89. 
6Ibid., p. 88. 
7Ibid., p. 88-89. 
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blame, of gain or loss. For a man does not serve that 
he may put men under obligations. He does not 
distinguish between friends and enemies or anticipate 
their thankfulness or unthankfulness, but he most 
freely and :lost willingly spends himself and all 
that he has . . .8 
Nor is this overflowing of good works manifested only in 
personal relationships, but it expresses itself in the 
political realm as well: 
Of the same nature are the precepts which Paul gives 
in Rom. 13, namely, that Christians should be subject 
to the governing authorities and be ready to do every 
good work, not that they shall in this way be justified, 
since they already are righteous through faith, but that 
in the liberty of the Spirit they shall by so doing 
serve others and the authorities themselves and obey 
their will freely and out of love.9 
By contrast, for Niebuhr, one of the great motivators 
for realizing justice in the collective life of man is 
man's "uneasy conscience." Thus "men ought to be driven 
by an uneasy conscience" to "all the possible extensions 
of justice.1110  
Franz Lau describes Luther's dialectic very succinctly: 
"Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms belongs inseparably 
together with his doctrine of justification, and in this regard 
particularly with his concept of the gospel." The sinner 
8Dillenberger, pp. 75-6. 
9Ibid., 14 78. 
10Niebuhr, pp. 190, 192. 
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is justified by grace, for the sake of Christ, through 
faith. Thus, 
the gospel is about what God has done for us, riot with 
what he reouires from us. It deals with the love with 
which he loved us, not with the love which he wants 
to see or arouse in us. The gospel must be purely 
proclaimed and not be mixed with legalistic elements. 
Faith may not be confused with the love through 
which it is active, nor with the obedience of faith. 
That the realm of the gospel and its proclamation is 
singled out as a particular kingdom, and as the preferred 
kingdom "on the right hand" at that, is the expression 
of the jealous watchfulness that the gospel of the 
Reformation not become corrupted by legalism. Works 
and love do not belong to the kingdom of faith. 
Luther can, in fact, talk about the two kingdoms as 
those of faith and of love. In contrast to the 
spiritual kingdom of the gospel, or of faith, there 
is the earthly kingdom of law, or of works, or of love. 
Thus Luther's distinction between the two kingdoms 
coincides alp_ost exactly with the distinction between 
law and gospe1.11  
Thus Niebuhr's charge that Luther denied the relevance 
of love for the social and political life of man is simply 
unfounded. after quoting Luther's Galatians passage, 
Niebuhr states his criticism in a different way, "Here we 
have the complete severance between the final experience 
of grace and all the proximate possibilities of liberty 
and justice, which must be achieved in history."12 
Lau is again relevant here: 
It would seem at first that Luther develops his ethics from 
the point of view of the political use of the law 
11Franz Lau, "The Lutheran Doctrine of the Two King-
doms," Lutheran World XII (1965), p. 361. 
to" 12Niebuhr, p. 193. 
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(usus politicus legis), but actually he begins with the 
"proper" or theological use of the law (usus proprius  
sive theologicus sive elenchthicus legis). Luther's 
UT6Trine of the two kingdoms and his understanding 
of the law belong together insofar as he proceeds from 
the radical nature of ethical demands. The law requires 
so much that it makes clear to the sinner how far he 
lags behind its demands. The consequence of this it 
that no human merit is possible and the idea of merit 
is completely purged from theology. The law demands 
unconditional love of God (with renunciation of all 
self-love), unconditional fear of God (with renuncia- 
tion of all fear :of men and political powers) and 
unconditional trust in God (with renunciation of all 
trust in self), and turns on the basic sins of 
Draesumptio and superbia. The doctrine of the two 
kingdoms does, however, procure for man, who in this 
sense is completely incapable of good, the possibility 
of doing relative good, of attaining civil righteousness, 
of acquiring merits coram hominibus, which perhaps may 
even avail before God--though never for man's justifica- 
tion. Thus, on the one hand, the law apparently precludes 
the possibility of a system of ethics; on the other hand, 
through Luther's interpretation of the law, with the 
aid of the doctrine of the two kingdoms, a concrete 
ethic is made possible.13 
Unfounded also is Niebuhr's claim that in Luther, the 
Kingdom of God is not relevant for the social and political 
life of man. ?or Luther, the worldly kingdom is indeed part 
of the Kingdom of God: 
';ie must firmly establish secular law and the sword, 
that no one may doubt that it is in the world by God's 
will and ordinance. The passages which establish this 
are the following: Romans 13 . . . . Likewise I Peter 
2 . . . .14 
13Lau, pp. 361-2. 
14"Secular Authority," Dillenberger, p. 366. 
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For Luther, the State is, 
God's peculiar work, ordinance 
is God's work and creation, it 
that every qne can use it in a 
way . . . .Lthe state is God's 
to punish the evil and protect 
and creation. . . . it 
is good, and so good 
Christian and saving 
servant and workman 
the gooqA15 
Luther, indeed, maintains a double link between 
Christ's kingdom and the worldly kingdom: objective and 
subjective. Objectively, the state is assigned the 
function of maintaining and preserving human life in order 
that the Gospel might have an opportunity to be preached. 
God thus assigns the State a function within salvation 
history.16 Subjectively, those who hold office are under 
the law of love: 
Thus a prince should in his heart empty himself of 
his power and authority, and interest himself in the 
need of his subjects, dealing with it as though it 
were his own need. Thus Christ did unto us; and these 
are the proper works of Christian love.17 
Luther can even say that such acts as killing in war or 
using the sword to quell a rebellion are really the 
exercise of love: 
in such a war it is a Christian act and an act of love 
confidently to kill, rob, and pillage the enemy, and to 
15Ibid., pp. 377-8. 
16Helmut 2hielicke, Theological Ethics, Vol. I: 
Foundations (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1 66), p. 376. 
17"Secular Authority," Dillenberger, p. 394. 
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do everything that can injure him until one has 
conquered him according to the methods of war.18 
Refering to the squelching of the peasant revolt by the 
secular authorities, Luther says that the Scriptures see 
sword 
the temporalAaright. "They see that out of great mercy, 
it must be unmerciful, and from utter kindliness, it must 
exercise wrath and severity."19 
Thus, contrary to Niebuhr's charge, Luther's teaching 
makes a very strong connection between love and the Kingdom 
of God and the social and political life of man, both for 
the individual citizen and for the public office holder. 
Another criticism Niebuhr makes of Luther is with 
regard to Luther's treatment of the peasant rebellion: 
He (Luther] places a perfectionist private ethic in 
juxtaposition to a realistic, not to bay cynical, 
official ethic. He demands that the state maintain 
order without too scrupulous a regard for justice; 
yet he asks suffering and nonresistant love of the 
individual without allowing him to participate in 
the claims and counter-claims which constitute the 
stuff of social justice. The inevitable consequence of 
such an ethic is to encourage tyranny; for resistance 
to government is as important a principle of justice 
as maintenance of government.20 
Enough of Luther's teaching regarding the two kingdoms 
and his application of it to the peasant revolt has been 
18Ibid., p. 398. 
10  XLV1, p. 73. 
20Niebuhr, pp. 194-5. 
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presented to show that Niebuhr's charge represents a 
serious misunderstanding and distortion of Luther's 
Position. Luther did demand that the state have a serious 
regard for justice. He did allow the peasants to participate 
in claim and counter-claim with the government in that 
he did recognize the legitimacy of their requests. Even 
when rebellion was imminent, Luther proposed arbitration 
as a way for the peasants and princes to settle their 
dispute and arrive at a solution.21 
Moreover, Luther's seemingly extreme demand of the 
peasants that they adopt an ethic of suffering and 
non-resistant love was a position adopted in an extreme 
situation where the only alternative seemed to be whole- 
sale rioting and pillage. Luther chose the lesser of two 
evils, but in his justification of this choice supported it 
with an application of his two kingdom doctrine which 
really represented somewhat of a distortion of his own 
position. Luther's two kingdom teaching as earlier 
espoused was much more flexible and allowed for more 
interplay between subject and emperor than would seem 
evident from Luther's application in 1525 during the 
peasant revolt. Nor was Luther's expectation of the 
possibility of a subject's interchange and counter-claim 
21"Admonition to Peace," LW, XLVI, 42-3. 
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with the government unrealistic. Peasants generally, 
had the right of appeal. .?eudal society was graded, 
and every lord had his overlord. If the common man 
was wronged, he might address himself against the 
lord to the overlord, all the way up to the emperor.22 
In certain cases, Luther even allowed for civil disobedience. 
But the historical circumstances involved in the peasant 
uprising seemed not to allow for such distinctions so that 
Luther's position could be justified on a pragmatic basis. 
In what he says, does Niebuhr suggest that more good than 
harm would have come had the pillage and rioting of the 
peasants been left to continue and increase unabated? 
There is another charge which Niebuhr makes, however, 
which is related to the abo#e, and which has within it the 
seeds of a substantial and legitimate criticism of Luther's 
two Kingdom teaching. Referring to the peasant revolt, 
Niebuhr says of Luther's position: 
evidently no obligation rests upon the Christian to 
change social structures so that they might conform 
more perfectly to the requirements of brotherhood. In 
his attitude towards the peasant revolt Luther 
rigorously applied this separation between the 
"spiritual kingdom" and the "worldly" one; and met the 
demands of the peasants for a greater degree of 
social justice with the charge that they were 
confusing the two. He took a complacent attitude 
towards the social inequalities of feudalism and 
observed that on earth there will always be masters 
and slaves.23 
2 2Bainton, p. 189. 
23Niebuhr, pp. 193-4. 
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In substantiation, Niebuhr quoted Luther's "Admonition 
to Peace" to the effect that the peasant demand for the aboli- 
tion of serfdom, 
would make all men equal and so change the spiritual 
Kingdom of Christ into an external worldly one. 
Impossible: An earthly kingdom cannot exist without 
inequality of persons. Some must be free, others 
serfs, some rulers, others subjects."24 
The context shows that Niebuhr's quote from Luther is a 
fair summary of Luther's position at this point.25  
The issue depends on what Niebuhr meant by the 
"obligation . . . troon the Christian to change social 
structures." If Niebuhr means to say that Luther did not 
try to change circumstances within the feudal system 
itself, we have already shown that Luther did not deny 
the legitimacy of such action but in fact encouraged it. 
If, however, Niebuhr also means to say that Luther never 
really auestions the structure of the feudal system itself, 
and possible inherent injustices within that structure, 
but instead tended to legitimate such Configurations, then the 
charge stands. 
Thielicke makes this point explicitly: 
At this point the question becomes urgent whether 
Luther does not lose sight of an essential element 
24Niebuhr, pp. 193-4, n. 15. 
6, XLVI, 39. 
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in the Sermon on the Mount, namely, the fact that 
the Sermon actually calls in Question this whole 
aeon. We have seen that Luther does in fact apply 
the commandment of love to the sphere on the left hand. 
But the suspicion still remains that in this sphere 
a variety of ways are prescribed for fulfilling the 
commandment, and that here the commandment as such is 
no longer able radically to call in question. Luther 
clearly overlooks the:fact that the significance of 
the commandment is not limited to its meaning within 
the orders, but goes beyond that to show how 
auestionable the orders themselves really are, 
failing as they do to measure up to the radicalness 
of the divine requirement. The commandment in 
effect characterizes the orders as "emergency" or 
"interim" solutions. Luther obviously does not 
perceive the problem posed by the fact that the 
commandment of love is modified by "the form of this 
world," that this is a symptbm of sickness, and that when 
God allows for any kind of "fulfillment" within the com- 
pass of this reality called "world" this is a sign 
of his patience and forbearance with our hardness 
of heart.26 
By contrast Thielicke describes what he considers to 
be the New Testament view regarding "two kingdoms:" 
In the New Testament the temporal kingdom and the 
kingdom of God are sequential in -.Joint of time, 
and the kairos, the "acceptable time," is the plane 
where the two aeons intersect. In Luther, however, 
the two kingdoms stand side by side, . . . Luther is 
concerned primarily not with two time continuums but 
with two spheres of reality. . . . 
'awn the two kingdoms are regarded as succeeding one 
another, however, and the eschatological tension 
remains, then there is none of this putting oneself 
at ease, . . . . the coming aeon "breaks in upon" this 
present aeon like a "disturbing fire." 
. . . all peaceful coexistence between the two aeons 
is thereby ruled out. To be sure, I must de facto pay 
26Thielicke, p. 378. 
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tribute to the world and its order, and I can do 
so Quite willingly and gladly, knowing of the 
divine patience and the saving purpose of these 
orders. But this does not mean that I can there-
fore acknowledge the various spheres and orders 
as "laws unto themselvesP For I am constantly 
reminded that the laws which are native and proper 
in this world, e.g., the laws of jurisprudence and 
politics, are really strange and alien so far as the 
kingdom of God is concerned.27 
Gerhard EbelinE's analysis of the relation of the two 
kingdoms seems to be similar to that of Thielicke here. 
Ebeling describes the worldly kingdom as being in a state 
of "self-contradiction," "a contradiction between the 
creatureliness of the world and the autocratic behavior 
of a world that denies its being created."28 This self- 
contradiction places the worldly kingdom in a relation of 
agreement and of disagreement with the kingdom of Christ: 
the relation of disagreement between the regnum 
mundi and regnum Christi is in the end the outbreak of 
tie contradiction between the fallen creature and the 
Creator. And the relation of agreement between the 
regnum mundi and regnum Christi is the dawning of agree-
ment between creature and Creator. The twofold 
relation between the regnum mundi and regnum Christi  
has thus to do with being a peccator and being 
iustus, since of course the peccator is the man who 
disagrees with the Creator and the iustus is the man 
who agrees with the Creator.29 
27Ibid., pp. 380-1. 
28Gerhard Ebeling, "The i'ecessity of the Doctrine of 
the Two Kingdoms," in Word and Faith (London: STK Press, 
1963, D. 398. 
20  'Ibid„ p. 399. 
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-;:erner Elert also points out this relation of 
agreement and of conflict between the two aeons: 
The conflict between the two aeons is the clash of 
two reigns. The kingdom of Christ is opposed by the 
kingdom of Satan and evil. 
Still, the cosmos which is identical with the °resent 
aeon is not exclusively the domain of Satan. It is 
also God's realm. . . . as creation it is God's work . . 
The result is that we cannot withdraw totally from 
the present aeon though we already belong to the 
reign of the future aeon. We cannot evade our 
responsibility to opDose evil by secular means within 
the present order in accordance with the will of 
God. Consequently we must distinguish between two 
aspects of the reign of God.30 
By contrast, we again note that Luther seems to place 
the two kingdoms side by side. Since both are God's 
ordinance, both are legitimate, and there seems to be 
little sense of tension between them: 
In this way, then, things are well balanced, and you 
satisfy at the same time God's kingdom inwardly and 
the kingdom of the world outwardly, at the same time 
suffer evil and injustice and yet punish evil and 
injustice, at the same time do not resist evil and 
yet resist it. 2lor in the one case you consider 
yourself and what is yours, in the other you consider 
your neighbor and what is his.31 
Though Luther is aware that the worldly kingdom is 
passing, he does not seem to draw out the consequences in 
30 Werner Rlert, The Christian Ethos (Philadelphia: 
2ortress Press, 1957), p. 291. 
31"Secular Authority," Dillenberger, p. 375. 
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terms of the ambiguity which this -places on the worldly 
kingdom. He notes in his commentary on. Mt. 5:38-42: 
Just learn the difference between the two persons that 
a Christian must carry simultaneously on earth, 
because he lives in human society and has to make 
use of secular and imperial things, the same way that 
the heathen do. For until he has been transferred 
bodily from this life to another one, his flesh and 
blood is identical with theirs; and what he needs to pro- 
vide for it does not come from the spiritual realm 
but from the land and soil, which belongs to the 
emperor. Now, with this distinction of the boundary 
between the province of the Christian person and 
that of the secular person you can neatly classify 




In this paper, we have examined Reinhold Niebuhr's 
charge that Luther's two kingdom doctrine is defeatist 
when confronted with realizing justice in the collective 
life of man. Following is a summary of the findings of 
this study. 
With regard to Luther's position, an adequate 
distinction needs to be made between Luther's formulation 
of the two kingdom teaching in his Sermon on the Mount  
and in "Secular Authority: To What Extent Should It Be 
Obeyed," and his application of it during the peasant 
rebellion. Further, the historical circumstances which 
surrounded Luther's formulation and application of the 
two kingdom doctrine needs to be taken into account. 
Thus, it will be seen that Luther's position with regard 
to the peasants was one taken in an extreme situation 
in which Luther took an uncompromising stand against the 
peasants only because it represented the lesser of two 
evils; and further that Luther then supported his position 
with an application of his two kingdom formulation which 
really represented a distortion of his earlier position, 
which had allowed more room for interplay between the 
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subject and the government and which had even allowed, 
in some cases, for civil disobedience. 
Niebuhr, in his critiaue of Luther, presented only 
Luther's extreme application of the two kingdom teaching 
to the peasant rebellion and in doing so, failed to take 
account of some of the historical circumstances which 
surrounded the peasant revolt, and further failed to bring 
out that Luther put the full blame for the rebellion on the 
princes and their unjust treatment of the peasants and 
that Luther suggested arbitration as a way to settle 
their differences. 
Moreover, in his critiaue of the passage in Luther's 
commentary on Galatians, Niebuhr failed to perceive 
Luther's rigorous attempt to keep the proclamation of the 
Gospel free from any legalistic element. This example is 
illustrative of Niebuhr's general failure to show that 
Luther indeed makes very basic connections between the 
Kingdom of God and the demands of perfect love on the one 
hand, and the social and political life of man on the other. 
There are indeed dimensions of Luther's two kingdom doctrine 
which allow and even demand action for improving the social 
and political life of man. 
Thus Niebuhr's charge of Luther's defeatism in social 
ethics is severely undercut by Niebuhr's own failure to 
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accurately and adequately portray Luther's position. Yet 
Niebuhr correctly perceived that Luther's perspective did 
not lead him to question the structure of the social and 
political arrangement itself. Eor this reason, there is a 
sense in which Niebuhr's charge of "auietism" on the part 
of Luther in realizing justice in the social and political 
life of man is justified. Luther seems to trace sin in 
the structure of the worldly kingdom to the non-purity of 
heart of those who hold office rather than that the 
whole configuration of the governmental structure may 
embody elements which contradict the law of love and which 
therefore fail to live up to the radicalness of the divine 
requirement. Luther does seem to place the two kingdoms 
side by side, with little tension manifested between them, 
rather than to regard the worldly kingdom as being succeeded 
by Christ's kingdom, thus making for a degree of "eschatological 
tension" in which the present order is always radically 
called into question. 
One of the Questions which remains unanswered by the 
study in the light of Luther's seeming adumbration of an 
eschatological perspective is whether this inadequacy is 
a natural consequence of Luther's theology or whether it 
is simply a manifestation of the fact that Luther failed 
to draw out the implications of the Christian'individual's 
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simul-iustus-et-peccator existence into the Christian's 
social and political life as well. This issue is beyond 
the scope of this study, however. 
At the same time, it must be realized that Luther's two 
kingdom formulation developed basically out of theological 
rather than social or political considerations. On the 
one hand, Luther was trying to forge a middle way in 
antithesis to both the Roman Catholics and to the 
radical reformers. On the other hand, Luther's basic 
purpose in formulating the doctrine of the two kingdoms 
was to preserve the purity of the gospel. 
In conclusion, however, we may say that Luther's 
two kingdom theology is far from defeatist when confronting 
the problem of realizing social and political justice. 
On the contrary, rightly understood, it allows and even 
demands such activity. 
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